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RECENT DECISIONS
would logically seem to belong with the other two. However, without com-
menting on the soundness of the reasoning, it is submitted that these three
cases and others stand as authority for the proposition that the Supreme
Court of Montana, under certain circumstances, has original jurisdiction
grounded upon its appellate function. The court has said that even with-
out objection it could not assume original jurisdiction unless authority to
do so could be found in the constitution."8 Therefore, it would seem im-
plicit in the Gullickson, Bottonly, and Carey cases that, before hearing the
petitions, the court had first decided it had original jurisdiction under the
Montana Constitution.
Moreover, it is submitted that the instant case stands for the same
proposition even though the court has not seen fit to expressly set it forth.
Here the question has been evaded with the excuse that. the petition prayed
for an injunction, a specifically enumerated writ. Yet the declaratory re-
lief sought was granted, although not eo nomine.
CHALnES C. LOVELL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESs--PYCHOLOGICALLY COERCED CON-
FEsSION-After a series of housebreakings involving rape or attempted rape,
petitioner, a 27 year old negro service station attendant, was arrested after
midnight in a white neighborhood and jailed on an "open charge of investi-
gation." Though no physical coercion was applied, petitioner was not pre-
sented for preliminary hearing but was kept practically incommunicado
for five days, during which time he was interogated two to three hours
each morning and afternoon. At that point a confession was made consist-
ing mainly of yes-or-no answers to questions, some of which were quite lead-
ing. Five more days of incarceration with continuation of the same treat-
inent culminated in a second confession. Defendant was convicted of bur-
glary with intent to rape and sentenced to death largely on the weight of
the two confessions. In connection with a pleaded defense of insanity, psy-
chiatrists testified he was a schizophrenic and highly suggestible, and his
mother testified he had always been "thickheaded," having entered school
at age eight and left at sixteen while still in the third grade. On appeal
the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed. On certiorari to the Supreme
Court of the United States, held, reversed. Confessions obtained as in this
case are involuntary, notwithstanding the absence of physical brutality and
long continued interrogation, and their use is a denial of due process. Fikes
v. Alabama, 77 Sup. Ct. 281 (1957) (Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice
Brennan, concurring separately; Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Reed
and Burton, dissenting).
This is the latest in a line of cases' involving the Court's declared rule
"of. State ex rel. City of Helena v. Helena Waterworks Co., 43 Mont. 169, 115 Pac.
200 (1911).
'Principal United States Supreme Court cases in this series are: Brown v. Missis-
sippi, 299 U.S. 278 (1936); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); White v.
Texas, 310 U.S. .0 (1940); Lisbena v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Ward v.
Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Lyons v.
Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944) ; Malinsky v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) ; Haley
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that it will reverse criminal convictions in the state courts based on involun-
tary confessions, as being a denial of due process of law guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment.'
The coerced confession rule based on the due process clause was first
invoked in 1936 in Brown v. Mississippi.! There the defendants, all ignor-
ant negroes, were convicted principally by means of confessions secured
through repeated beatings, brutality, and physical torture which was ad-
mitted by witnesses at the trial, and the Supreme Court inaugurated this
precept by finding the confessions to be involuntary and the convictions
void. Affirmative brutality thus clearly became a basis for reversal, and
subsequently the Court found little difficulty in reversing convictions in-
volving confessions tainted by physical abuse.' The problem has been in the
application of the rule where the physical element is absent, or at least not
so obvious, and the decision must be based on principally psychological coer-
cion or a combination of physical and psychological factors. This is illus-
trated by a brief consideration of a few of the principal cases.
In 1941, in the Lisbeva case, a murder suspect was taken from his
house to another, where a dictaphone was concealed, "slapped" around and
continuously questioned for 48 hours without sleep. After arraignment he
was held incommunicado, finally promising to confess if he could eat. Given
food he confessed at about 3:00 a.m. His conviction was affirmed, two jus-
tices dissenting. Although the Court stated it would have reversed if the
confessions had been found to be coerced, apparently it was reluctant to so
find in the absence of more physical pressure. Significant here is the
Court's disregard of such elements as deprivation of rest and food; the
original concept of physical brutality prevailed.
In 1944 a conviction based on a confession was reversed where the de-
fendant was repeatedly grilled over a four day period while kept naked in
a hotel room. There was a sharp conflict in the evidence as to physical pun-
ishment, but the other methods employed--denial of rest, long continued in-
terrogation during unusual hours, and illegal detention without clothes-
were considered sufficient to place the stamp of "involuntary" on the con-
fession.' This opinion also declared that the Court would determine the
question of due process independently from the evidence and where coer-
sion was present the conviction would be reversed, notwithstanding the ad-
v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) ; Lee v. Mississippi, 333 U.S. 742 (1948) ; Watts v. In-
diana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) ; Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949) ; Harris v.
South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949) ; Johnson v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 881 (1950) ;
Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181
(1952); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 557
(1954), and the instant case.
'A distinction should be made here between authority to supervise state courts and
authority to supervise federal courts. This latter power Is based on the fourth and
fifth amendments and on the power to supervise generally federal criminal pro-
ceedings. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) ; United States v. Mitchell,
322 U.S. 65 (1944).
"299 U.S. 278 (1936).
'See White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940) ; Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
'Ltsbena v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
'Mallnsky v. New York, 324 U.S. 409 (1945).
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ditional evidence may have been sufficient to convict standing alone.' It
is important to note that this decision was not grounded on physical brutal-
ity, and after this case the physical element was not considered a pre-
requisite of coercion. The same reasoning was applied shortly thereafter
in reversing the Ashcraft case' upon a finding that constant interrogation
by relays for 36 hours amounted to coercion.
Reversal was ordered in 1948 in the Haley case, when a 15 year old boy
was convicted of murder after being arrested at midnight and questioned
by relays of police until he signed a confession early the next morning.'
This established the willingness of the court to condemn lengthy interroga-
tion at unusual hours, especially where facilitated by relay tactics. Im-
plicit here also is a consideration of the subjective ability of the accused
to resist the methods employed.' Another conviction was reversed the same
year where a 17 year old negro boy was found guilty of assault with intent
to rape upon the testimony of two detectives who stated he had orally con-
fessed to them shortly after arrest." The defendant assailed the confes-
sion as being involuntary, following intimidation and maltreatment. The
reasoning here appears to be largely an extension of that in the Haley case,
especially in connection with the consideration of age and ability to resist.
The Leyrae case turned on a peculiarly psychological point. The de-
fendant was suffering from a sinus affliction and after a long period of ques-
tioning, was taken to a highly trained psychiatrist for the purported pur-
pose of medical aid. Instead, while pretending to help the accused, he se-
cured a confession which led to conviction. The Supreme Court had little
difficulty in finding a violation of due process in the methods used and
reversed the conviction. The psychological aspect of this case is probably
nearer.the instant case than any other; the only punishment approaching
'physical" being that of deprivation of rest.
The decision in the instant case is based primarily upon the accused's
inability to resist methods which heretofore have not been sufficient to
render a confession involuntary. Conspicuous is the absence of such factors
as deprivation of food and rest, long continued interrogation, relay tactics,
and questioning during unusual hours. These are the factors which have
appeared in greater or lesser degree in the foregoing cases to bridge the gap
between the affirmative physical brutality in the Brown case and the purely
psychological coercion in the instant case. Considering this case in the light
of this "bridge" it is readily apparent that the decision rests solely and
entirely upon the psychological aspect, and thus is the most liberal decision
on coerced confessions yet handed down. In delivering the majority opinion
Justice Warren stated:
There is no evidence of physical brutality, and particular
'Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), apparently overruled this declaration, at
least where the question has been presented to a jury, by holding that the jury may
consider the confession, reject it as involuntary, and still convict on the weight of
the remaining evidence.
8Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
0Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
"Subsequently this policy was expressed in Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953),
and is quoted in the principal case. See note 14, infra.
"Lee v. Mississippi, 333 U.S. 742 (1948).
"Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 557 (1954).
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elements that were present in other cases in which this Court ruled
that a confession was coerced do not appear .... The totality of the
circumstances that preceded the confessions in this case goes be-
yond the allowable limits. The use of confessions secured in this
setting was a denial of due process .... 'The limits in any case de-
pend upon a weighing of the circumstances of pressure against
the power of resistance of the person confessing. What would be
overpowering to the weak of will or mind might be utterly ineffec-
tive against an experienced criminal". . . .' We hold that the cir-
cumstances of pressure applied against the power of resistance of
this petitioner, who cannot be deemed other than weak of will or
mind, deprived him of due process of law.""
Historically, the determination of admissibility of the involuntary con-
fession in the state courts has been through application of the test of re-
liability-whether it is as likely to be false as true.' The application of the
fourteenth amendment by the Supreme Court of the United States to
coerced confession cases has presented a new concept. In the earlier cases
the Court's rationale seems to be that it was the accused's constitutional
right to have a fair trial, and that coercion, not being conducive to truth
and accuracy, constituted a denial of due process of law. But after the
Ashcra.ft case it appears that if the confession be the product of coercion it
is inadmissible per se, without regard to its veracity.
Underlying all the coerced confession cases are two principal questions.
First, to what degree ought the Supreme Court of the United States super-
vise criminal proceedings in the state courts? This issue was squarely pre-
sented for determination in Chambers v. Florida." Counsel for the state
challenged the power of the Court on the ground that the nature of the
confession had already been examined by the state courts and found as a
matter of fact to be voluntary, and that any attempt to set aside this find-
ing would be a usurpation of jurisdiction. In rejecting this contention and
reversing the conviction, the Court declared that it would determine the
nature of all such confessions independently from the evidence." The sec-
ond problem, the factual prerequisites for a finding that a particular con-
fession is "involuntary" and "coerced," concerns the unfolding, increas-
ingly liberal doctrine previously discussed herein.
That these two questions constitute the principal difference of opinion
in the majority and dissenting views throughout the coercion cases is nicely
illustrated by the instant case." Here, the dissenting opinion maintains
that (1) this is simply a set of facts over which reasonable men might differ
as to conclusion, and (2) reversal oversteps the boundary between the right-
ful provinces of the state courts and the Supreme Court. The concurring
'Quoting Stein v. New York, 346 U.S.' 156, 185 (1953).
"4Instant case at 284-85.
'This is true in Montana. State v. Dixson, 80 Mont. 181, 260 Pac. 138 (1927) ; State
v. Walsh, 72 Mont. 110, 232 Pac. 194 (1924) ; State v. Guie, 56 Mont. 485, 186 Pac.
329 (1919). See also 7 WIoMoR, Evmsnc. § 2070 (3d ed. 1940).
"309 U.S. 227 (1940).
"This was affirmed subsequently in Malinsky v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945),
and has been the procedure followed in each of the above cases.
1See also Asheraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
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opinion recognized the delicacy of the Supreme Court's position, but de-
cided that the circumstances taken as a whole justified reversal.
The foregoing considerations demonstrate the extent to which the in-
stant case exceeds those which preceded it. The question which remains is
the outlook for the future. It is submitted that the decision in the instant
case represents one further stage in the liberal evolution of the coerced
confession rule, finally grounding a decision on totally psychological coer-
cion, and that this doctrine will persist as a basis of condemnation in fu-
ture involuntary confession cases.
CHARLES C. LOVELL
CRIMINAL LAW-FELONY-MURDER RULE-RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEATH
OF FELLOW ARSONIST-Defendant service station lessee hired Donald Free-
stone to burn his station. Freestone, unknown to defendant, induced Mervin
Bishop to help commit the arson. Defendant was not present when the arson
was committed. Bishop acted as a look-out while Freestone spread gasoline
about the station. The pilot light of a water heater caused the gasoline to
explode, and both Freestone and Bishop died as a result of burns received
in the explosion. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder for the
death of Bishop. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Montana, held, af-
firmed. Any death directly attributable to a plot to commit arson makes
all the conspirators equally guilty of first degree murder. State v. Mar-
ran, 306 P.2d 679 (Mont. 1957) (Justice Davis concurring; Justices Angst-
man and Anderson dissenting on a question of evidence).
At the common law, a, homicide committed while perpetrating a felony
was murder,' and from an early date Montana has provided a similar rule
by statute. The applicable statutes provide that murder is the unlawful
killing of a human being with malice aforethought,' and that all murder
committed in the perpetration or the attempt to perpetrate arson, rape,
robbery, burglary, or mayhem, is murder in the first degree.' When a
homicide results unintentionally from the perpetration or the attempt to
perpetrate a felony, the malice necessary to make the homicide murder is
supplied by the intent to commit the felony, and is transferred by operation
of law to the act which caused the death.' Thus, any death, though unin-
'Mansell and Herbert's Case, 2 Dyer 128b, 73 Eng. Rep. 279 (K.B. 1555).
2RnvIsED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 94-2501 (Hereinafter the REvisED CODES OF
MONTANA are cited R.C.M.).
3R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2503.
'26 Am. Jur., Homicide § 39 (1940). An interesting question at this point is the
effect of the Montana statutes upon the existence of malice as an ingredient in the
felony-murder rule. It could be argued that the requirement of malice is dispensed
with through the enumeration in section 94-2503 of the five felonies to which the
felony-murder rule applies, or, in other words, that the statute creates a felony-
murder rule, limits it to the five named felonies and does away with the traditional
position that malice is an essential ingredient in the crime of murder. Another
effect of this construction would be that except as provided by the statute there
Is no felony-murder rule in Montana.
However, section 94-2501 provides that "murder is the unlawful killing of a
human being with malice aforethought." This appears to make malice an essential
ingredient in all cases of murder. Also, section 94-2503 says "all murder" com-
mitted in the course of the named felonies is first degree murder. This appears to
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